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Family Figures in 20th-Century British ‘Psy’ 
Discourses 
Wendy Hollway 
Open University 
ABSTRACT. This article takes the three figures child, mother-child couple 
and father and charts their discursive movements over the course of the 
20th century in Britain, concentrating particularly on the changes 
happening around the time of the 1939-45 war. Over time, there is a 
significant shift from the individual child to the mother-child relation and 
the importance of fathers for children’s self-development appears and 
disappears as a theme. A rigid construction of stages unevenly gives way 
to an idea of phase less amenable to a normative discourse. At any given 
time, there is considerable diversity within ‘psy’ discourses, and I focus 
particularly on the differences between and among psychological and 
psychoanalytic discourses. Certain expressions of psychoanalysis have, in 
my view, been more successful in theorizing subjectivity as it develops 
over time within the relations of the family in a way which exceeds or 
transcends the ‘psy’ complex’s subjectifications and yet does not reduce 
personhood to an asocial essence. By locating its ontology within the 
practices and epistemology of psychoanalysis, I consider the conditions for 
this relative freedom. 
KEY WORDS: attachment, family figures, object relations, post-
structuralism, ‘psy’ complex 
The ‘Psy’ Complex, Subjectification and Subjectivity 
In the post-structuralist critiques of the family and self that appeared in 
the last decades of the 20th century, the idea of the ‘psy’ complex was an 
important one for focusing attention on the nexus of power-knowledge-
practice relations that constructed, or produced, family members at a time 
when families were an important target of regulation. According to 
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Nikolas Rose (1990), by the mid-century, children were linked to the 
formal government machine in three ways: through public health, the 
juvenile court and child guidance clinics. The ‘psy’ disciplines, it is argued, 
contributed authoritative discourses which constructed their objects -the 
child, the mother-infant pair, the parental couple, the family - in ways 
that worked to normalize certain identities. These power-knowledge 
relations informed professional practices and policy formulation. 
Moreover, expert discourses framed the norms or values to which people 
themselves aspired, through self-regulation. This is a key feature of what 
Foucault referred to as ‘subjectification’, the representation - through 
expert discourses - of childhood, motherhood, fatherhood, parental 
conduct, family life, in such a way as to ‘infuse and shape the personal 
investments of individuals’ (Rose, 1990, p. 129). This occurs not just 
through government institutions, but also through childcare books, radio 
broadcasts, mothercraft training and women’s magazines. According to 
Rose, following Foucault, the ‘psy’ complex was influential in these 
developments. 
Subjectification was seen as central in producing subjectivities. 
Indeed it is central in the way that the ‘psy’ complex is typically defined: 
for example, ‘the regulatory apparatus which constructs and assesses 
subjectivity through the monitoring and classification of separate 
“psychological selves” it then works to produce’ (Burman, 1991, p. 142). 
The concept of the ‘psy’ complex does not observe the conventional 
distinction between disciplines and the apparatuses that put knowledge 
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into practice. It encompasses disciplinary knowledges such as 
psychometrics, developmental and clinical psychology and psychoanalysis 
.** Rose (1996) quotes Hall and DuGay: ‘It has become impossible to 
conceive of personhood, to experience one’s own or another’s personhood or 
to govern oneself or others without “psy”’ (p. 139). 
While both of the above quotations are careful to avoid a socially 
determinist formulation, post-structuralist theory has been criticized for 
failing to theorize a subjectivity that exceeds its positionings. I am 
particularly interested in psychoanalytic attempts to conceive of how 
subjectivity (self or individuality) developed within families and the extent 
to which these attempts were limited by and exceeded or transcended the 
‘psy’ complex’s powers to subjectify. This theme is pursued more centrally 
in the companion paper (Hollway, 2006b), based on the detail in the 
present one. 
I focus on three family figures - the child, the mother-child couple 
and the father within the family - and show the changes of emphasis, over 
time and between discourses. The history that I outline below identifies 
three overarching and sometimes conflicting paradigms: first there is that 
which treats the individual child, almost independently of its context; this 
is partially displaced by a dyadic approach to the mother-child (and later 
the father-child) relationship, which at times is supplemented by a triadic 
account, bringing the role of the father into development. As a 
generalization (one which is not new), before the 1939-45 war the focus of 
intervention was largely children themselves, rather than their 
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relationships in the family. The contrast between this focus on the 
individual and a dominant set of assumptions in British developmental 
psychoanalytic practice at the end of the 20th century is evident in the 
following claim: 
One feature common to [various therapeutic] 
approaches ... is the presence of the infant and the 
value that this has of allowing the therapist to 
observe in detail, and at first hand, the nature of the 
relationship between parents and infant in the here 
and now. This feature of the clinical setting has now 
become a cardinal principle of most parent-infant 
therapies. It is rooted in the idea that it is the 
relationship that is being treated, not one or other 
member of the dyad or triad. (Miller, 1999, p. 4) 
Measuring the Normal 
At the beginning of the 20th century, psychoanalysis was a very new 
phenomenon and psychology had still not broken off from philosophy to 
establish itself as a science. Psychoanalysis grew out of medicine and a 
clinical concern with mental illness. Psychology first modelled itself on 
physics, setting up laboratories to conduct experiments on perception. 
Developmental psychology grew up closer to the observation tradition, 
pioneered by Darwin, Freud and Piaget. It was not long, however, before 
psychometrics, the basis of what Burt (1924) called ‘a new, advanced and 
separate branch’ of what he referred to as ‘individual differences in mind’ 
(p. 67), eclipsed experimental psychology as a result of its usefulness in 
placing individuals in groups (‘educationally subnormal’, for example) for 
the purposes of regulation. It grew spectacularly because of its utility and 
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success in categorizing people into groups for whom specific treatments 
could then be prescribed by government: the grammar or the secondary 
modern school child, the mentally subnormal or the normally intelligent, 
officer material or not, mentally ill, and so on. Psychometrics is the 
measurement of psychological (as opposed to physical) characteristics. If a 
characteristic of interest for social regulation could be measured, then any 
person could be compared to all others by virtue of their positions on the 
normal curve. What was normal became colonized by a statistical concept. 
Conflating what was seen as natural with statistical normality in this way 
had powerful effects on subjectivity through reinforcing conformity, 
pathologizing delinquency and encouraging competitiveness. This new 
branch of psychology, called individual differences - applied, pragmatic 
and atheoretical - has been the focus, but not the only target, of a critique 
of the ‘psy’ complex and its regulatory and technical priorities (Rose, 
1996). 
Meanwhile early developmental psychologists aspired to the 
ethological methods pioneered in the study of non-human animals as a 
model for the observation and cataloguing of child behaviour. The Child 
Study Movement started with Darwin (who kept a record of observations 
on his own son). Its concern was to describe ‘patterns of growth and 
behaviour with the aim of likening human infants to the rest of the animal 
kingdom’ (Urwin, 1986, p. 266). Riley (1983, p. 46) draws attention to the 
gender of science in these observations. Fathers could function as 
detached scientists, even in relation to their own children, and liberally 
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commented on the fact that mothers could not be trusted not to let 
sentiment intrude, such that their knowledge would not be objective. The 
model of the detached scientist produced psychological objects that were 
also seen as detached, and the idea of the isolated, asocial individual 
dominated early developmental psychology, as it did in many other areas 
of psychology and philosophy (with notable exceptions, for example the 
work of William James). Developmental psychology’s methods and its 
resort to biological notions of sensitive periods, bonding, imprinting, 
genetic determinations and - above all - normative stages of development 
were a product of this tradition (e.g. the work of Gesell; see Rose, 1990, ch. 
12). 
Psychology’s construct of the developing child was a useful 
technology in government of the family. According to post-structuralist 
criticism, the ‘scientific’ expertise of psychology prescribed norms of 
development, based on a belief in development as a progression of 
naturally determined** stages. These manufactured norms provided the 
categories with which parents, paediatricians and children themselves 
could judge the child’s development and engage their subjectivity:  
In the inevitable gaps between the behaviours of 
actual children and the ideals of these norms and 
images, anxiety and dissatisfaction are generated in 
parents, anxiety that is the occasion for seeking 
professional guidance to manage the discrepancy 
between the experienced and the desired. (Rose, 1990, 
p. xi)** 
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In this way, the privacy of family life did not present a barrier to 
regulation because these norms ‘commanded a level of subjective 
commitment from citizens, inciting them to regulate their own lives 
according to its terms’ (p. 126). 
From Stage to Phase in Normal Child Development 
The ‘psy’ discourses are themselves capable of reflection, critique and 
reform, however. Criticism of the naturalized idea of stages of 
development has subsequently come from within developmental 
psychology (Bradley, 1990; Burman, 1991, 1994; Morss, 1990). It became 
apparent that empirical fit with these stages was poor, for example in the 
case of Piaget (Urwin, 1986) and of Kohlberg’s stages of moral 
development (Gilligan, 1982). The debate continues. On one hand, 
undergraduate textbooks continue to use a ‘model of development that is 
uniform, ahistorical, culture-free and normative’ (Burman, 1991, p. 389). 
On the other, it is argued that the idea of development and phases should 
not be thrown out with the bathwater of the stage model. In Benjamin’s 
(1995) terms: ‘children really do represent and assimilate some things 
before others, are preoccupied with certain conflicts at one time more than 
another, as the idea of phase suggests’ (p. 52). 
Freudian psycho-sexual stages have also been subject to critique 
and development. Already in the 1940s, Klein used the term ‘positions’ 
rather than ‘stages’ to designate the ‘paranoid-schizoid’ and ‘depressive’ 
dynamics of intersubjective mental life. In contemporary British and 
relational psychoanalysis, this usage is fundamental to how subjectivity is 
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understood. In this view the theory of positions, rather than stages of 
development, ‘constituted a significant shift within psychoanalytic 
understanding ... away from the explaining and curing of discrete 
symptoms and towards one in which developmental possibilities are traced 
in the person as a whole, in relation to their prevailing mental states’ 
(Waddell, 1998, p. 6). In the same vein, Erik Erikson described 
developmental stages that spanned the entire lifecycle. Each was not fixed 
but depended on what had been accomplished in the previous stage for 
how it came to be expressed. In many ways this departed from a ‘stage’ 
model. 
Likewise in the US, Daniel Stern, who bridged developmental 
psychology and psychoanalysis at the end of the century rather like John 
Bowlby did in Britain in the 1950s, uses his own term ‘domains of 
relatedness’ to contrast his approach with stage theories:  
All domains of relatedness remain active during 
development. The infant does not grow out of any of 
them; none of them atrophy, none become 
developmentally obsolete and get left behind. And 
once all domains are available, there is no assurance 
that any one domain will necessarily claim 
preponderance during any particular age period. 
(Stern, 1985, p. 31) 
Increasingly, then, a refined idea of phases in development is espoused in 
which psychic events overlap and recur, are often coincident and not just 
successive. The concept of phase is less easy to operationalize in 
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regulatory practices, but a change in several ‘psy’ discourses, towards 
complexity and away from predictability, did nevertheless take place, 
influenced by evidence from real children. 
Differences between Psychological and Psychoanalytic Discourses 
The shift from stage to phase illustrates change over time across 
discourses; the conditions of production of psychology and psychoanalysis 
illustrate distinct differences between ‘psy’ discourses at any given time 
following the emergence of conflict between them early in the 20th 
century. When and how these two come together (notably in the work of 
Bowlby and recently Stern, in the US) suggests a significant conjuncture 
since psychology and psychoanalysis have been in competition and conflict 
since the early 20th century, precipitated in particular by the rise of 
behaviourism and psychometrics in psychology. 
The child as rational, unitary individual remained the dominant 
analytic unit for developmental psychology, epitomized in Piaget’s account 
of cognitive-developmental stages. (Piaget’s interest in and use of 
psychoanalytic work on children disappeared from popular knowledge 
about Piaget’s contributions; Urwin, 1986, pp. 269-271). Critiques of this 
rational, unitary child followed (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & 
Walkerdine, 1984; Richards, 1974; Richards & Light, 1986) but it has 
remained the dominant assumption of developmental psychology. Urwin 
(1986) documents how any emotional or aggressive content has been 
evacuated from this vision of childhood and resides, instead, in 
psychoanalytic discourses. 
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The methodological context is helpful in explaining the marked 
differences that emerged between psychology, with its base in scientific 
method, and psychoanalysis, rooted in the clinic. Psychoanalysis’s cradle 
of observation was the consulting room and its method relied on the free 
associations of patients and the interpretative framework of the analyst, 
with the aid, from the 1950s onwards, of transference evidence. 
Stern (1985, p. 14) distinguishes these two traditions in his 
categories ‘the observed infant’ and ‘the clinical infant’, thus making the 
point that images of the infant differ as a result of the two methods. 
However, he claims that the clinical infant of psychoanalysis was a 
remembered construct from adults on the couch. In Britain this was far 
from the case. During the 1930s, Melanie Klein, Anna Freud and 
Margaret Lowenfeld, along with many others, were using versions of a 
play therapy technique to understand the inner life of children and 
infants. This was not just in a therapy setting, but also in nurseries and 
child guidance clinics. Nonetheless their approaches, like Winnicott’s 
subsequently, were informed by psychoanalytic theory. Partly in 
consequence, there is a marked contrast between the ‘emotional’ infant of 
psychoanalysis (characterized by desire, conflict, aggression, libido and 
defences against anxiety) and the ‘rational’ infant of developmental 
psychology (all skilled performance, perceptual development, cognition, 
motor coordination and the development of reason). 
Psychology and psychoanalysis are also based on different 
epistemologies: 
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… different notions of cause and effects, of relations 
between past and present and of developmental 
processes themselves. For example, psychology has a 
preference for specific events or processes which can 
be taken as causal and predictive of later outcomes. 
This is linked to a view of development which, broadly 
speaking, progresses ‘upwards’. [For psychoanalysis] 
the relation between past and present is never one of 
simple determination. It is not that there is no 
relation between life events and mental concomitants, 
but the psychic implications of environmental 
contingencies cannot be read off directly, nor can they 
be entirely predicted. The subjective consequences are 
a complex product of meanings produced through 
previous life history, present circumstances and 
constructions engendered through the individual’s 
own phantasies. (Urwin, 1986, p. 258) 
A difference in method - between measurement and free association, 
between scientific observation and clinical intervention, between 
statistical analysis and hermeneutic interpretation, between objectivity 
and subjectivity - ensured that psychology and psychoanalysis produced 
radically distinct knowledges. The methods were partly influenced by the 
site of intervention and therefore the terrain on which evidence was 
encountered. In the 1950s and 1960s, psychoanalysis was deeply involved 
in welfare practices, largely through its impact in social work, but also in 
paediatrics and child psychotherapy. By the 1970s, its influence in 
mainstream social welfare had been considerably diminished and the 
influence of psychoanalysis became a more theoretical one. Psychology’s 
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direct contributions to welfare practice have been more stable. They have 
been effected largely through public health and educational institutions, 
through the use of technologies for the measurement of children’s physical 
and mental capacities. These are graded according to their achievement in 
relation to developmental norms, for example in the assessment of 
‘intelligence’ through the IQ test and cognitive development through 
Piaget’s tests. 
Psychoanalysis, with its base in clinical practice, tends to construct 
its objects as pathological, as deviations from the normal, whereas 
psychology’s object has been normal behaviour; in the context of children, 
normal development. However, as Urwin (1986) cautions, the ways 
psychoanalysis has been incorporated into professional practices, which 
rely on a distinction between normal and abnormal, ‘tend to render as 
pathological what psychoanalysis takes as fundamental to all of us’ (p. 
275). At the same time, psychology’s developmental norms became the 
standard against which deviation was measured. 
The Changing Child in Child Guidance 
Child guidance emerged from a combination of a psychoanalytic tradition 
with progressive educational discourses that encouraged creativity and 
free play as a means to healthy child development. The ‘mothercraft’ 
movement of the 1920s (of which the New Zealander Truby King was a 
prominent exemplar) advocated stern regulation of children and frowned 
upon mother love. However, through the work of early women analysts 
such as Horney, Deutsch and Klein (Sayers, 1992) as well as Ernest Jones, 
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psychoanalysis was already moving from Freud’s emphasis on paternal 
authority to a greater focus on mothering. The 1930s saw the more liberal 
elements of the ‘new psychology’ incorporated into the nursery school 
movement, educational psychology and child guidance. There was a surge 
of childcare manuals based on these ideas. Anderson and Aldrich’s 
Understand Your Baby came out on the eve of the war in 1939 and, 
according to Hendrick (1997), was ‘one of the landmarks in childcare 
literature’ (p. 30). Susan Isaacs, a psychoanalytically informed 
educationalist, reinterpreted children’s anti-social tendencies as 
‘emotional dilemmas’ (Hendrick, 1997, p. 30). This perspective exemplifies 
a dramatic challenge to the dominant eugenics discourse, which viewed 
delinquent children as the product of bad inherited traits in the poorer 
classes. In the 1930s, when babies who were institutionalized while 
waiting for adoption suffered as adults, it ‘was considered a reflection of 
the morally inferior nature of women who had conceived out of wedlock’ 
(Eyer, 1992, p. 50). 
The 1930s saw the first professional training in child 
psychotherapy. By 1944 there were more than seventy Child Guidance 
clinics in Britain, despite the wartime disruptions; in 1952, there were 155 
(Urwin & Hood-Williams, 1988, p. 108). Such research was closely linked 
to the actual conditions of children across Britain, which provided a rich 
source of complex, case-based evidence. The clinics’ staff were** mostly 
medically trained. The first demonstration clinic under the auspices of the 
Child Guidance Council saw ‘backward children’ (the largest group), 
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‘delinquent children’ (the second largest, chiefly accused of theft) and a 
group referred for nervousness, unmanageability, and the like. The 1932 
report claimed a 48 per cent ‘fully adjusted’ success rate (Urwin & Hood-
Williams, 1988, p. 72). When urgent practical problems were posed as a 
result of war - for example, concerning the evacuation of children from 
bomb danger - it was the Child Guidance and child psychotherapy 
traditions, including, as they did, powerful medical influences, that 
provided plausible insights and practical recommendations. For example, 
in 1939, Donald Winnicott, Eric Miller and John Bowlby were all 
signatories to a piece in the British Medical Journal expressing the 
opinion that the psychological danger of removing children from their 
families outweighed the physical danger of leaving them in the cities.** 
This liberal tradition influenced post-war expert discourses. 
Wartime Upheaval and Its Effects on Familial Discourses 
The 1914-18 war was influential in precipitating the development of 
psychometrics. Two issues produced during the 1939-45 war and its 
aftermath provided the immediate and salient context for psychoanalytic 
discourses: children separated from parents; and women in employment. 
This was arguably the heyday of psychoanalytic influence in the British 
public and welfare sphere. Until the 1970s, British social workers used a 
predominantly psychotherapeutic model for case work, after which 
sociology’s emphasis on social disadvantage saw a widespread rejection of 
psychoanalysis in favour of an emphasis on supporting clients’ access to 
material and social resources. 
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Women demonstrated their capacity for doing men’s work during 
the war. Now it is routinely claimed that their return to motherhood and 
the home afterwards was strongly influenced by Bowlby’s expert discourse 
on maternal deprivation and its harmonious fit with the government’s 
desire to re-establish its traditional male labour force and promote its 
post-war pronatalist policies. Riley argues that a detailed look at the 
historical evidence undermines this claim. For example, the Ministry of 
Labour was of the view that as many women as possible would be needed 
in employment after the war (Riley, 1983, p. 121). There were conflicts 
among Ministries and there was much indecision before the wartime 
nurseries were closed. They were criticized not on grounds of maternal 
deprivation, but on public health grounds that children in nurseries were 
extra-vulnerable to respiratory tract infections. In practice, between 1946 
and 1955 the number of married women in employment rose by two and a 
quarter million to three and a quarter million (nearly a half of all women 
at work) (Titmuss, 1958,** cited in Riley, 1983, pp. 146-147). According to 
Riley, there was no uniform post-war movement to rehabilitate the family. 
She concludes that post-war welfare spoke increasingly to ‘the assumed 
needs of separate family members’: ‘the true target of post-war social 
philosophy was the mother’ (Riley, 1983, p. 170). Evidently this rests on a 
firm belief in the significance of the mother-child relation, without which 
influences on the mother would not be expected to reach the child. 
War produced a natural experiment on a grand scale when many 
children were displaced from their positions in the traditional gender-
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differentiated family. While fathers went to war, mothers went out to 
work in droves. Parental couples were broken by separation and death and 
children were orphaned. Not only day-care but residential nurseries were 
established to care for children and these provided laboratories for child 
observation: ‘for the first time the everyday life of (normal) children could 
be visualized** through the perceptual grid of psychoanalysis’ (Rose, 1990, 
p. 161). Anna Freud’s Hampstead nursery was founded in 1938, and in 
1944 she and Dorothy Burlingham published Infants without Families on 
the basis of their experiences in the nursery (Burlingham & Freud, 1944). 
The Treasury took over the funding of residential nurseries in 1941. 
Children were evacuated from the big cities and fostered with families in 
rural areas. Questions concerning the psychological grounds for these 
decisions were subdued during the war itself, when physical safety 
considerations were presumably paramount, but afterwards the issue 
proliferated: what difference did any of these separations make to 
children? ‘(R)esidential nurseries became the focus of arguments already 
established before the war (and which were to extend long after it) about 
the harmful effects of institutional care and the necessity of conventional 
family life to produce the balanced member of civil society’ (Riley, 1983, p. 
115). 
Winnicott had been publishing on such questions, from within both 
a paediatric and psychoanalytic tradition, since the 1930s. He modified 
Klein’s focus on the effects of children’s phantasy, and emphasized their 
actual experience of maternal care. His series of wartime broadcasts 
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started in 1939 and was published in The New Era in Home and School 
from 1940 on. In 1940, John Bowlby wrote critically about evacuation and 
nursery care from the perspective of the child’s need for its mother. 
However, Juliet Mitchell (2004), drawing on the detailed empirical 
evidence collected by Isaacs, Klein and Bowlby for the evacuees’ survey in 
Cambridge, points out that it was children who were evacuated without 
their siblings who suffered, with the others improving in their lateral 
relations. In other words, family disruption could not be reduced to 
maternal deprivation. The conditions of war - actual separations of family 
members, the trauma that sometimes followed - precipitated the 
appearance of discourses whose central themes were relationship and 
attachment. John Rickman, a psychoanalyst, commented that ‘we do not 
fully realise what the family means to us until it is disorganised’ (p. 53).** 
Soon after the war, following this considerable attention to the 
institutionalization of children, followers of Bowlby, notably James 
Robertson and his wife Joyce, were central in transforming the hospital 
provision for sick children (see companion article , 2006b). Reforms were 
based on what was now recognized as their distress when, not only 
removed from their homes, they were faced with a succession of different 
nurses, an arrangement which made surrogate attachments impossible 
(Robertson & Robertson, 1989). At first, the Robertsons’ attempts met 
with hostility from paediatricians. The observation of children was central 
to the success of their campaign: the Robertson’s films presented 
naturalistic evidence in an emotionally engaging way. This use of 
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observation is an example of synthesis between psychological and 
psychoanalytic traditions. 
The Mother-baby Relationship 
The emphasis on the mother-child relationship developed during the 1939-
45 war can, in retrospect, be seen as the early articulation of a relational 
paradigm (in contrast to the individualist one), which has since become 
widespread in social science, albeit with many expressions and varying 
emphases. Developmental psychology has been affected by this (Richards, 
1974), notably by Trevarthen’s work on mother-infant intersubjectivity 
(1977, 1979). However, the dominance of the biological frame in this 
tradition is seen in the way that intersubjectivity was understood to be 
part of a normal core of development which unfolded according to 
biological principles (Urwin, 1984, 1986). ‘Protosociability’ was understood 
as a capacity of the infant, and not something in the relationship between 
infant and adult. 
Psychoanalysis was transformed by a growing emphasis on the 
mother-’infant relation, probably best exemplified in the UK by the work 
of the Tavistock Clinic. (In the US, feminist theorists such as Chodorow 
[1991] and Benjamin [1990, 1995, 1998) are explicitly writing in a 
relational tradition which owes more to American ‘relational 
psychoanalysis’; see, e.g., S. Mitchell & Aron, 1999.) The initial move was 
from instinct theory to what, following Klein, was called object relations, 
which also involved a shift from Oedipal dynamics and a focus on the child 
or adult to infant-mother relations at a time before the establishment of 
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self. From Freud’s paradigm of the self being forged out of the clash 
between the sexual drive or libido and the repressive forces of civilization, 
the move was to an emphasis on the self being forged out of the 
unconscious intersubjective dynamics originating in the mother-infant 
relation. According to Benjamin (1990), ‘the last twenty-five years have 
seen a flowering of psychoanalytic theories about the early growth of the 
self in the relationship with the other’ (p. 12). In the UK, John Bowlby and 
Donald Winnicott exerted strong early influence over these moves, which I 
illustrate in detail below. 
Winnicott took Klein’s basic object relations principle and moved it 
further in an ‘environment’ direction: that is, he emphasized the effects of 
the real care of the actual mother (as opposed to the phantasy mother in 
the infant’s mental life) on the subsequent development of the child. 
Winnicott’s phrase ‘good enough mother’ has been incorporated into a 
wider discourse based on the principle that children need their mothers for 
psychological development. His way of understanding the mother-baby 
relation is radically relational, as captured in his well-known epigram that 
‘there is no such thing as a baby’ (outside of the baby-mother couple). 
However, as can be seen in the way that he described the positive effects 
of the mother’s failure, imperfection, absences and hate, as well as the 
importance of her understanding her baby’s communications and 
responding to them, Winnicott was not working with a simplistic 
deprivation paradigm. In addition, he explicitly worked against 
undermining mothers’ confidence in their own intuitions about how to look 
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after their babies. This was in marked contrast to the many baby care 
manuals after the First World War, with their dislike of any tenderness or 
empathy with babies, laying down rules from a position of expert 
authority. From the perspective of Foucault’s critique of the role of experts 
in the production of ‘truth’, Winnicott’s position was paradoxical because 
here was an expert using his authority to advise mothers to go with their 
own intuitions. 
Bowlby’s importance resides both in laying the foundations for 
attachment theory and in his concept of maternal deprivation. The latter 
claim, namely that any separation of young children from their mothers 
would result in psychological damage, was the subject of vehement 
feminist critique. Bowlby’s early work, conducted in the 1930s and 
probably based on children at the London Child Guidance Centre, 
investigated the biographies of forty-four juvenile thieves (Bowlby, 
1946)** and concluded that a significantly large number of these boys had 
experienced early separations from their mothers, or mother substitutes, 
which were traumatic. A control group of other ‘problem children’ did not 
show the same high incidence. Here we can see the relevance of that other 
governmental institution and its relation to ‘psy’ discourses: the juvenile 
court. It was probably on the basis of this influential work that Bowlby 
was invited to write the World Health Organization report on Maternal 
Care and Mental Health (1952). He concluded that ‘the evidence is now 
such that it leaves no room for doubt ... that the prolonged deprivation of 
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the young child of maternal care may have grave and far-reaching effects 
on his character and on the whole of his future life’ (p. 56). 
Riley (1983, p. 98) points out that Bowlby’s ideas on maternal 
deprivation were a synthesis of much available work, for example on 
institutionalization in the US (Spitz, 1945). We should also not forget 
Harlow’s experiments with monkeys, which were published in the 1940s. 
They showed that monkeys who had been separated from their mothers 
and fed by a bottle attached to a wire frame were incapable of functioning 
as mothers themselves, of mating, or of social life in the group. In 
retrospect, the huge ideological leap from this kind of evidence is obvious: 
a range of deprivations, distress and trauma was at risk of being reduced 
to a single factor - the physical presence of the mother. 
Subsequent criticism of Bowlby has positioned him simply as a 
psychoanalyst (see, for examples, Eysenck’s foreword to Patrician 
Morgan’s critique, 1975, and Wootton, 1959), but psychoanalysis at the 
time was critical of his work, as he was of it. Bowlby’s criticism of 
psychoanalysis was not unlike Winnicott’s initially: he disliked the way it 
did not recognize the effects of the mother on her child. In fact, Bowlby 
drew liberally on ethology (observation of animal behaviour), and his 
paradigm therefore depended on evolutionary theory, as did 
developmental psychology at the time. For example, his formulation of 
attachment as an instinct was based on the principle that ‘animals who do 
not develop attachment behaviour are unlikely to leave any offspring, 
while those who do develop it live and breed’ (cited in Riley, 1983, p. 107). 
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He drew parallels between humans and birds in a way that is still 
common in a psychology that resorts to zoology. Eyer (1992) documents 
the way that this mode of thinking precipitated a craze for the idea of 
mother-infant bonding in the 1970s and 1980s in the US. Hospital delivery 
was, for a time, fixated on an ethological notion of bonding derived from 
the idea of ‘imprinting’ in young birds and other animals. A few minutes 
right at the beginning could secure all the benefits of a good mother-child 
relationship! The terms ‘bonding’ and ‘attachment’ were used 
interchangeably and there was no stable definition of either (Eyer, 1992). 
As in Bowlby’s work, the quality of that relationship was ignored. 
Differences in Bowlby’s and Winnicott’s Treatment of the 
Mother&ndash;Infant Relationship 
While ‘the mother’ and ‘maternal care’ are constructs used liberally in 
both Winnicott and Bowlby, the terms hide a profound difference of 
paradigms theorizing the mother-infant relationship. Whereas Winnicott 
talked about emotional relationships of care and dependency, Bowlby’s 
ethological paradigm leaned towards a notion of instinctual attachment, 
based on proximity. A Kleinian analyst, Dr Susanna Issacs Elmhirst, said 
that Bowlby ‘ignores love and anguish, the real stuff of human life’ 
(Grosskurth, 1986, 406).** 
Fifty years after its introduction, Bowlby’s concept of attachment 
has come to dominate in a very wide domain both theoretically and in 
terms of empirical research. The basic idea remains ‘that children have a 
natural propensity to maintain proximity with a mother figure, that this 
leads to an attachment relationship and that the quality of this 
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relationship in terms of security/ insecurity serves the basis of later 
relationships’ (Howe, 1995, p. 46, citing Rutter, 1991, p. 341). This central 
proposition, like Winnicott but in a different vein, emphasizes that it is 
the mother-child relationship (now extended to parent-child or primary 
carer-child) that is the most important feature of parental care. Bowlby is 
now widely regarded as mistaken on two points: first, that care of the child 
by one maternal figure should be continual (though it should have 
continuity); and second, his claim, drawn from the idea of imprinting in 
ethology, of monotropism, namely that infants attach to one figure who 
alone can provide a secure base. In contrast, ‘Today the attachment 
concept has broadened almost enough to describe the successful 
development of babies being raised by multiple caretakers - a situation 
originally thought to cause maternal deprivation’ (Eyer, 1992, p. 69). 
Bowlby’s core position is captured in the claim that the mother is 
‘going to be his [the child’s] anchor - whether she likes it or not - and 
separations from her are going to give rise to problems’ (Bowlby, cited in 
Riley, 1983, p. 101). While there is, in my view, a fundamental truth in 
this (as long as the mother includes the idea of mother substitute as well), 
it illustrates the over- and under-generalizations that characterized his 
approach: primary carers are reduced to biological mothers, children have 
no specified age, separations are not qualified in context, length or 
meaning. It thus contributed to the phenomenon of ‘Bowlbyism’, ‘the 
intense concentration on the married mother permanently in the home 
with the child as the unique and adequate guarantee of the child’s psychic 
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health, the defence against delinquency, and family and therefore “social” 
breakdown’ (Riley, 1983, p. 109). 
The concept of attachment has had a much longer life and a more 
reputable career than the concept of maternal deprivation. It is more 
closely linked with Bowlby’s reforming work in hospitals and over time 
has become more or less detachable from Bowlby’s zoological proclivities. 
An influential strand of empirical work in the US (Ainsworth, Bell, & 
Stayton, 1974) demonstrated attachment behaviour through the 
systematic use of a ‘Strange Situations Test’, which, because it succeeded 
in operationalizing and standardizing the idea of separation anxiety and 
attachment behaviour, has been widely taken up, as has the ‘Adult 
Attachment Interview’ (see, e.g., Steele, Steele, Croft, & Fonagy, 1999; 
Steele, Steele, & Fonagy, 1996). Social work was the keenest institutional 
location for Bowlby’s early ideas. Bowlby, when interviewed, reported that 
‘the social workers took to it with enthusiasm; the psychoanalysts treated 
it with caution ... paediatricians were initially hostile but subsequently 
many became very supporting ... of course the academic psychologists were 
bitterly hostile’ (M. Senn, 1977, cited in Eyer, 1992, p. 45). Contemporary 
social work looks to be re-embracing attachment theory, albeit critically 
(Howe, 1995;** Kraemer & Roberts, 1996). A 2003 report by the head of 
research at the National Family and Parenting Institute comments that 
attachment theory is accepted in New Labour’s family policy. As part of 
his recommended parenting code, he notes that it is important for 
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‘working parents to meet the attachment needs of their children’ 
(Henricson, 2003). 
Child development experts, who at first glance appear similar, 
demonstrate some important differences that, over time, lead to different 
theoretical, methodological and applied take-up of their work. In the 
process, discursive possibilities for understanding mother-baby 
relationships proliferated and offered new choices in the subjective 
positions they afforded and thus the investments that could be gratified. 
Fathers 
Fathers are the absent presence in mid-century discourses, and that 
remains the case until the 1970s. This absence in the post-war mother-
child discourses does, however, require consideration. In the early debates 
about evacuation and residential nurseries, the father was subsumed in 
the concept of ‘family life’, for example: ‘Psychologists, studying the social 
phenomena of war, gave scientific warrant to the need for family life in 
development, which mankind had always instinctively known’ (Bruce, a 
social policy commentator in the 1960s, cited in Riley, 1983, p. 114). 
The father is seen by Winnicott as the supportive context for the 
mother and baby. Initially he is not assumed to be in direct relation to the 
baby; only providing support for the mother-infant couple. Underlying this 
assumption was the belief in separate spheres for women and men, whose 
practices and personalities then provided necessary role models for sons 
and daughters. Since the discourse was concentrated so exclusively on 
babies, fathers’ roles were rarely discussed. Winnicott, however, in his 
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series of wartime broadcasts, gave one entitled ‘What about Father?’ in 
which, following Freudian principles, the father represents outside 
authority: he is ‘the human being who stands for law and order which 
mother plants in the life of the child’ (Winnicott, 1945,** p. 115). This 
remains a salient theme in psychoanalytic theorizing (see, e.g., Trowell & 
Atchegoyen, 2002). According to psychoanalysis, this is because: ‘The 
father’s symbolic role as culture is about not being the body in which the 
baby has been carried, suckled and about which the baby phantasizes a 
perpetual, fused future’ (Minsky, 1999, p. 13). Winnicott also talked about 
how hatred of parents could usefully get split between them, so that love 
of the mother, on whom the infant depended, could feel more secure. 
Bowlby, like Winnicott, assigned the father to a position outside the 
mother-baby relationship. He went on ‘remove Father permanently from 
the scene - by death or divorce or any other reason - and the whole picture 
changes tragically for the worse’ (Bowlby, 1958,** cited in Riley, 1983, p. 
101). The evidence from current clinical child psychoanalytic therapy 
presents a more refined view of such conclusions, for example suggesting 
that clinicians need to distinguish between the difficulties that  the 
father’s absence raises for the child and the  distress provoked in the 
mother  (Target & Fonagy 2002; see also Blundell, 2002). 
This claim of fathers’ indispensability, which is reiterated 
throughout the following decades and remains common in social policy 
today, is based on the idea that children (particularly sons) need fathers in 
order to grow up into moral citizens. Here the focus is on older children, 
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not babies. Freud articulated this in Oedipal theory (again the focus being 
on the child not the infant) and his notion of the superego, which can be 
seen as a belief deeply rooted in patriarchal, religious and enlightenment 
thinking, whose subjective effects Freud theorized and of which he was 
then used as the legitimator (J. Mitchell, 1974).** A journalist researching 
fatherhood concluded that ‘the most striking fact ... is the centrality of the 
image of the authoritarian father to moral and political debate in the West 
over many centuries’ (Burgess, 1997, p. 2). To agree with the dominance 
and longevity of this discourse is not, however, to reject the possibility 
that, in patriarchal family arrangements, the father did represent the law, 
which in turn has deep psychological (and gendered) effects on children’s 
subjectivity. 
Although Freud tends to stand accused of privileging the mother-
child relationship at the expense of the father (e.g. Parke, 1981, p. 14), in 
his theory, fathers had the decisive effects on a child’s development 
because the Oedipus complex, with its focus on fear of the father’s 
authority, was seen to virtually obliterate what preceded it: that is, the 
mother-infant relationship. In psychoanalysis the father stands for 
difference: ‘not the mother/ not me’. Freud’s Oedipal theory had the virtue 
of considering both parents in relation to the child. In contrast, much later 
theory has tended to move, seesaw-fashion, from focusing on the mother-
child dyad to resurrecting the father-child dyad. More recently there has 
been a revival of the triangular principle in current British psychoanalytic 
theorizing of fathers in families (Britton, 1993; Trowell & Atchegoyen, 
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2002 see Hollway, 2006b). Contemporary feminist psychoanalysis, through 
the work of Benjamin (1995), has seen the pre-Oedipal father brought 
back into the picture (e.g. Frosh, 1997). 
Current concern about delinquent boys draws on a notion, 
embedded in popular discourses, of how important it is for boys to have a 
masculine role model with which to identify. However, earlier work, 
similar to Bowlby’s in design, was ignored outside a small group of 
academics. The work of Robert Andry, during the late 1950s and 1960s 
(Andry 1960, 1962), closely paralleled Bowlby’s, and its virtual 
disappearance suggests that the wider discursive climate was a key factor 
in elevating the authority of Bowlby’s work. In 1962, Andry’s work on the 
influence of both paternal and maternal roles in delinquency was 
published by the World Health Organization (as Bowlby’s was a decade 
before). It specifically aimed to reassess the maternal deprivation 
argument. Andry’s sample of eighty delinquent and eighty non-delinquent 
boys from South London echoed Bowlby’s forty-four juvenile thieves. 
Andry found no evidence that the delinquent boys had experienced 
separation from mothers or fathers. The delinquent boys, however, had 
largely unhappy relationships with their fathers. Andry concluded: ‘It was 
the inadequacies in their fathers’ roles, rather more than in their mothers’ 
roles, that served to differentiate delinquents from non-delinquents’ (cited 
in Green, 1976, p. 63). 
For this to be taken up, it would have required a shift of popular 
concern from mothers to fathers and also from ideas about what mothers 
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provided naturally to an emphasis on the quality of the relationship - 
maternal or paternal. This came later: by the beginning of the 1980s, 
Ehrensaft, in the US, could claim that: 
According to recent psychological studies, anyone can 
mother an infant who can do the following: provide 
frequent and sustained physical contact, soothe the 
child when distressed, be sensitive to the baby’s 
signals and respond promptly to a baby’s crying. 
Beyond these immediate behavioural indices, 
psychoanalysts argue that anyone who has personally 
experienced a positive parent-child relationship that 
allowed the development of both trust and 
individuation in his or her own childhood has the 
emotional capabilities to parent. (Cited in Trebilcot, 
1983, p. 48) 
Coming to the surface more recently is the fear that if men are not 
contained and socialized within families (i.e. where they are fathers), 
there is no hope of civilizing them (e.g. Dennis & Erdos, 1992). Maureen 
Green (1976), a British journalist who was one of the first to catch on to 
the new wave of concern with fathers in the 1970s, came to a conclusion 
which encapsulates many of these fears: ‘Mother’s ascendance and father’s 
decline leads to a system of child upbringing that is strongly biased in 
favour of girls, a bias that gets strengthened with each generation’ (p. 82). 
Later, girls attracted serious discursive attention, led by feminist 
psychoanalysts, the central themes being daughters’ problems of 
psychological separation from the mother and girls’ development of 
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separated and/or relational selves (Brown & Gilligan, 1993; Ernst, 1997; 
Henwood, 1995; Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver, & Surrey, 1991). 
The adequacy of fathers in terms of the overall quality of their 
relationships with their children has not been the focus of psychological 
research, despite the fact that in the 1970s psychologists started to turn 
their attention to the role of fathers. Michael Lamb (1981),** an American 
psychologist researching into fathers, acknowledged that ‘researchers 
have tended to focus on a small number of paternal characteristics, often 
ignoring other relevant factors and the family constellations within which 
father-child relationships are embedded’ (p. 24). This is due in part to 
impoverished methods (how do you quantify that overall quality?) and in 
part to the lack of a theoretical framework which illuminates the 
dynamics of relationships. Psychology in the 1970s asked the following 
kinds of questions (Lamb, 1981):** What difference is there between 
children raised with and without fathers? What is fathers’ role in cognitive 
and intellectual development? What different roles do fathers perform 
from mothers? What is fathers’ role in moral socialisation? (According to 
Hoffman [1981), ‘the evidence here suggests, contrary to Freud and others, 
that fathers are far less important than mothers as direct agents of moral 
socialization’ [p. 375].) What is fathers’ role in the sex-role development of 
sons and daughters? The findings produced in answer to these questions 
appear to be an attempt, backed by the authority of science, to produce, in 
competition with mother, a modern, benign father (not a mention of 
violence or abuse, for example) who is ‘vital’ for satisfactory cognitive, 
 31
moral and especially gender development. On the back of one Fontana 
paperback, for example (Parke 1981), an anonymous voice summarizes: 
New research has shown that by the age of eighteen 
months, many children are more attracted to their 
father than to anyone else - including their mother - 
because father tends to be more playful and 
stimulating; that little girls who enjoy good 
relationships with their father are more at ease with 
strangers and more socially assured; that sons of 
absentee fathers show a higher incidence of teenage 
delinquency; that sons fare better in the care of their 
fathers after divorce. 
The appearance of these discourses on fathers in the 1970s makes 
sense in the context of the rise of feminism, women’s further moves into 
the labour market and a decade of liberal law reform, which loosened 
men’s grip on their wives and children through marriage. A benign and 
participative father was discovered in psychological discourses (see Lewis, 
1987, for an example influenced by feminism). The question of whether 
mothers and fathers do the same job when they ‘parent’ has remained 
curiously unasked outside of the recent Kleinian revivals of the idea of the 
Oedipal triangle (Hollway, in press, ch. 5).** 
Conclusion: Unruly, Changing and Conflicting Discourses 
In documenting the discursive changes in family figures in Britain, 
focusing on the period around the 1939-45 war, I have tried to show the 
dynamic and diverse character of ‘psy’ discourses. My purpose in doing 
this is to unsettle oversimplified notions of ‘psy’ discourses producing 
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familial subjectivities directly in the service of regulation. Changes over 
time occurred for many reasons, both external and internal to the ‘psy’ 
discourses. For example, the separation of family members in the 1939-45 
war constituted a powerful extra-discursive reason for a broad movement 
towards discourses that emphasized the importance of family relations in 
self- development. Internally to several ‘psy’ discourses, I documented the 
way in which earlier images were challenged by evidence from practising 
experts, as in the case of ‘stage’ and ‘phase’, even when this shift was 
contrary to the convenience of a normalizing technology. Considerable 
variation between discourses, notably psychology and psychoanalysis, was 
a product of uneven changes in epistemology, methodology, professional 
location and form of intervention. Controlling, normalizing tendencies 
were challenged, more or less successfully depending on methodology, by 
unruly evidence deriving from familial subjectivities that defied 
subjectification. 
The central theme in developmental discourses came to concern the 
role of significant, familial others in the development of self. By 
introducing a life-historical dimension, and an intersubjective ontology, 
this question complicates the problematic of post-structuralist theory, 
namely how do discourses situated within power-knowledge-practice 
relations produce subjectivities? Some of the same ‘psy’ discourses that 
stand accused of subjectifying family members were also addressing the 
question of the formation of subjectivity in family relations through 
naturalistic evidence. In a companion article to this one (Hollway, 2006b), 
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I try to go beyond the conclusions of post-structuralist theory by 
evaluating some examples of ‘psy’ discourses and practices from a psycho-
social point of view and outlining what I argue is a workable post-critical 
theory of the development of subjectivity, focusing on family relations.  
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